UNDRESSING THE CEO: DISCLOSING PRIVATE,
MATERIAL MATTERS OF PUBLIC COMPANY
EXECUTIVES
Tom C. W. Lin*
“A company that is required to undress in public will pay more
attention to its figures.”
—Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2008, Steve Jobs, the iconic CEO of Apple Inc., 2
came on stage in San Francisco to make one of his grand product
announcements. But, without saying a word, his mere appearance—thin
and hollowed—sent the company’s stock moving. 3 Apple shareholders
and the marketplace began wondering whether his pancreatic cancer, which
he was treated for in 2004, had returned. 4 The company refused to
comment on Mr. Jobs’ health condition, stating that it was a “private
matter.” 5 The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) rules are
* Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell. J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School. Cert. in
Business & Public Policy, Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania.
B.A., New York University. Special thanks to John Agozzino, Anita Allen, Regina Austin,
Jill Fisch, Kristin Madison and Monica Pal for their comments and criticisms; and thanks to
many others for helpful conversations on the topic. The views expressed herein are my own
and do not necessarily reflect the views of Davis Polk & Wardwell, its partners, or any of its
other attorneys.
1. Eric Dash, More Pieces. Still a Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at A1.
2. See JEFFERY S. YOUNG & WILLIAM L. SIMON, ICON STEVE JOBS: THE GREATEST
SECOND ACT IN THE HISTORY OF BUSINESS 238-46 (Wiley, John & Sons, Inc. 2005)
(chronicling in brief the fall and rise of Steve Jobs as a modern day icon and business
mogul).
3. See Jobs’s Job, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2008, at 68 (discussing the effect of Jobs’s
health on Apple’s financial outlook).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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silent on such situations, there is little legal scholarship in this area, 6 and
different companies have varying disclosure practices for executive
illness. 7 Further clouding the matter, a New York Times reporter, after
having an “off the record” conversation with Mr. Jobs, reported that while
his health problems were “more than ‘a common bug,’ they weren’t lifethreatening.” 8 What is an investor to do with this lack of clarity, this lack
of material information?
Information—accurate, timely information—is at the bedrock of any
free market. 9 The market for publicly traded securities in the United States
is no exception; 10 in fact, it may be the prime example of an informationintensive and information-sensitive market. 11 The federal government,
through the creation of the SEC and the enactments of the Securities Act of
1933 12 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 requires companies with
publicly traded securities to make fair, timely disclosures of material
information to the investing public. 14 The stated purpose of securities
laws 15 is to “substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor.” 16 As a result, hundreds of thousands of rules and
6. See Peter Elkind & Doris Burke, The Trouble with Steve Jobs, FORTUNE, Mar. 5,
2008, at 88, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/02/news/companies
/elkind_jobs.fortune/index.htm (explaining that the SEC has not yet taken action against any
company for failing to disclose issues about a CEO’s health).
7. See Joe Nocera, Apple’s Culture of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008 at C1
(noting that the chief executive of Intel did not inform shareholders of his prostate cancer
diagnosis while McDonald’s immediately informed shareholders of its CEO’s colorectal
cancer diagnosis).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488, 488-90 (1970) (analyzing the importance of
accurate information through the prism of asymmetrical information in the used automobile
marketplace).
10. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 761-67 (1985) (highlighting
the importance and costs of information in an efficient securities market).
11. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 341 (1979) (discussing the importance
of how timely and accurate information in the securities market can lead to enhanced
resource allocation.).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 1,
48 Stat. 74).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 1,
48 Stat. 881).
14. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 721 (2006) (“In efficient markets, information about the
value of firms is incorporated quickly and accurately into stock prices.”).
15. Use of the term, “securities law,” in this Article refers to the federal securities laws,
namely, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See infra Part III.
16. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
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regulations—constantly examined and updated—require publicly traded
companies to disclose everything from key contracts and financial
statements to employee headcounts and perceived risks. 17 While more
information has become available about publicly traded companies,
arguably not enough information is available about the people who run
those companies. The growing regulatory spotlight on public companies
has created a penumbra over their boardrooms and executive suites. 18
What does the investing public have a right to know about a company’s 19
executive officers? 20 Is a chief financial officer’s divorce settlement 21
material information? What about a chief executive officer’s sex life, 22
home purchase, 23 internet usage habits, 24 or financial status? How about a

17. See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2008) (outlining how Regulation S-K under the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
of 1975 spell out the various types of information that a public company must disclose in
their respective filings with the SEC).
18. See Elkind, supra note 6 (alluding to the lack of clear guidance from the SEC on
private but material matters, such as health issues involving public company executives);
see, e.g., Linda Grant, Shareholder Profit v. CEO Privacy: Recent Cases Renew Debate
over Disclosure of an Executive's Illness, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1993, at D1 (highlighting the
absence of clarity in securities law for disclosure of executive illness). See generally Dash,
supra note 1, at A1 (“‘Sunlight,’ remarked the Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, ‘is
said to be the best of disinfectants.’ One problem with too much sunlight, however, can be
the blinding glare.”).
19. Use of the term, “company,” in this Article refers to a publicly traded company in
the United States.
20. Use of the terms, “director,” “officers,” or “executive,” in this Article refers to such
persons that serve on those publicly traded companies. See infra Part IV.A (defining the
relevant persons that are the key subjects for the purposes of this Article).
21. See Katherine Yung, Dean Foods Keeps Move in the Open: Company Says its CEO
Will Sell Stock to Help in Divorce Settlement, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 28, 2003, at
2D (Reporting that the chairman and chief executive of Dean Foods Company announced
that he was selling his shares in the company to facilitate his divorce settlement).
22. See Alan Cowell, BP's Chief Quits Over Revelations About Private Life, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 2007 at C1 (reporting on the resignation of a prominent chief executive
following the public disclosure of his sexual relationship with a gay companion.); see also
Alex MacDonald, Benoit Faucon & Michael Williams, BP’s CEO to Resign Immediately
Amid Revelations of Private Life, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2007, available at
http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/safepipelines/message/10107 (“The storied tenure of
John Browne, the CEO who turned BP PLC into one of the world's most-valuable oil
companies, came to an unceremonious end today, after a British court allowed a U.K.
newspaper group to publish a set of articles about the executive's long relationship with a
young man.”).
23. See Crocker H. Liu & David Yermack, Where are the Shareholders’ Mansions?
CEOs’ Home purchases, Stock Sales, and Subsequent Company Performance, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, Oct. 17, 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract=970413 (studying the
impact of home purchases and stock sales by CEOs on the performance of their companies).
24. See David Kesmodel, Whole Foods Sets Probe as CEO Apologizes, WALL ST. J.,
July 18, 2007, at A3 (reporting that Whole Foods CEO, John Mackey, anonymously posted
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chief executive officer’s diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease? Or a venereal
disease or other health matters? 25 What private information is material to
the reasonable investor? 26 What does material mean in this context? 27
Should the SEC require more disclosure on material, private matters?
The issue about what types of material, private information should be
disclosed will be of significant concern to academics and regulators, to
Wall Street and Main Street, and to corporate titans and average citizens in
the present and coming years 28 as the investing marketplace’s voracious
need for more information 29 confronts the executive’s innate human desire
to protect it. 30 The SEC has been silent on this issue and there has been
little scholarship on the matter as well, but the changing investing
landscape of the 21st century requires a critical examination of this issue.
In 2006, it was reported that some 57 million American households, or
about half of all American households, have some investment in the stock
messages on internet chat rooms advocating for his company and thrashing competitors,
which led to a SEC investigation).
25. See Andrew K. Glenn, Disclosure of Executive Illnesses Under Federal Securities
Law and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Hobson's Choice or Business
Necessity?, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 537, 537-41 (1994) (examining the shortcoming of federal
securities law concerning the disclosure of executive illness); see also Benjamin Pimentel,
Public Disclosure: Health of CEOs Brings up Issues of Personal Privacy, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 3, 2004, at C1 (discussing the lack of guidance in terms of what CEOs are required to
disclose about their health).
26. See Mark Maremont, Scholars Link Success of Firms To Lives of CEOs, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 5, 2007, at A1 (discussing scholarship that studied the private events of CEOs and
their relationship to company performance).
27. See infra Part III.C (discussing the concept of materiality in the context of securities
law).
28. See Letter from Alan Greenspan to Representative Edward J. Markey, (July 28,
1998), quoted in Toby Lester, The Reinvention of Privacy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2001,
at 29 (“The appropriate balancing of the increasing need for information in guiding our
economy to ever higher standards of living, and essential need of protection of individual
privacy in such an environment, will confront public policy with one of its most sensitive
tradeoffs in the years immediately ahead.”).
29. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Provides Guidance to Open Up Use of Corporate
Web Sites for Disclosures to Investors (July 30, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-158.htm [hereinafter SEC, Disclosure to
Investors] (“Ongoing developments in technology have increased both the markets’ and
investors demand for more timely company disclosure on the Web, and in turn, raised new
securities law issues for public companies to consider.” (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher
Cox)).
30. See Letter from Alan Greenspan to Representative Edward J. Markey, (July 28,
1998) quoted in Loretta Nott, Report for Congress, The Role of Information in Lending:
The
Cost
of
Privacy
Restrictions,
1
(2003),
available
at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL31847_05192003.pdf
(“Too little information that can be used in marketing leads to a decline in the quality of the
goods and services offered. Too much can be perceived as an inordinate incursion of
privacy of person.”).
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market, through stocks, mutual funds, or retirement plans. 31 The growing
participation of the general population in the securities market will also
likely increase the desire for more information and the political will to act
accordingly via legislation and rulemaking. 32 In the securities market
context, a fundamental question must ultimately be answered: should there
be more privacy or more disclosure when it comes to material, private
matters of public company executives?
This article argues that practical and realistic answers to this question
favor more meaningful, material disclosure and less privacy for executives
while working within the existing regulatory framework. 33 Structurally,
my argument proceeds as follows: Part II will consider why more
disclosure about the private matters of public company executives may be
desirable through an examination of the growing investor base, the
enhanced position of the executive, and the equalizing role of regulated
disclosure in the modern information age. Part III will discuss the
disclosure (and non-disclosure) of private, material matters through the
prism of the general disclosure obligations under the federal securities
laws. Part IV will offer a model approach for disclosing material, private
matters which works within the current federal regulatory framework and
imposes limited additional burdens on public companies. Finally, Part V
will address some of the key critiques and concerns about additional
disclosures from executives, namely, those that relate to the burdens of new
regulations, their impact on companies, and their effect on the privacy of
executives.
II.

WHY MORE DISCLOSURE?
Why more disclosure? This query presumes that more disclosure

31. See Richard Cheney, Vice-President of the United States, Remarks at the Chicago
Mercantile
Exchange
(June
23,
2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/06/text/20060623-12.html (discussing the
growth of the American economy and business investment).
32. See infra Part II.A (discussing the growing investor base as a reason for more
disclosure about company executives).
33. It can be argued that existing securities law may already require such disclosure.
However, it is difficult to discern with great certainty whether the drafters of the Securities
Act intended for the Act to cover private, material matters of executives. The Act itself is
silent on that point. However, the legislative history suggests that the Act was intended to
cover “the type of information required to be disclosed…by competent bankers from their
borrowers.” H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933). Arguably, a competent
banker in 1933 (or presently) would likely find information, such as CEO’s diagnoses with
Alzheimer’s disease, the type of information that should be disclosed, and reasonable minds
exercising an abundance of caution can read Regulation S-K to require such disclosures, but
historically disclosures have not included such private matters.
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about public company executives is: (1) possible and (2) desirable. The
first part of the presumption is true; the second part is arguably as true if
such disclosure is qualified by materiality, 34 as is the case with most SECmandated disclosure. 35 More material disclosure about executives is
desirable and perhaps necessary because the current regulatory regime and
current disclosure practice give a growing base of investors, in an
increasingly complex marketplace, insufficient information to make sound
investment decisions. 36 Additionally, the role of the executive has
changed; the enhanced premium that the growing market places on good
executive officers and the discount it places on bad ones has increased the
desirability of more material information about executives. 37 While such
information may be garnered through alternative (and sometimes less
reliable) means, 38 regulated principle-based disclosure 39 under the current
34. See infra Part III.C (discussing materiality in the context of securities law).
35. While greater transparency and disclosure from companies can lead to better
corporate governance, the former does not necessarily guarantee the latter; and “more
information” as a general principle may not always be desirable if not qualified by
materiality. More information in an increasingly complex financial system can overwhelm
and obfuscate an investor. See Zachary Karabell, The Myth of Transparency, NEWSWEEK
(Atlantic Ed.), July 7, 2008, at 47:
The sheer volume of information that companies provide both in the United
States and in other countries is so vast that it takes full-time analysts and
regulators to parse it. Even then, there is a tacit understanding that much of
what a company reports has to be taken on faith. Only if a company is
investigated by a regulator is it truly possible to discover the veracity of the
information it provides. In short, a company can be fully transparent and still
be fraudulent.
36. See Vikram Pandit, Toward a Transparent Financial System, WALL ST. J., June 27,
2008, at A11 (“Transparency must also include public disclosures to investors about
pertinent risk and financial information that give the market a chance to make informed
judgments.”). Contra Karabell, supra note 35, at 47 (“[E]ven if companies disclose
everything they are required to and more, they can still deceive and commit fraud.”).
37. See, e.g., Daniel Grebler, Companies Should Be Open About Executive Health,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 10, 1993, at 2D (noting the rise of a company’s shares due
to market uncertainty about an executive’s health status); Kenneth R. Sheets et al., If the
Boss Isn't Around, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 19, 1987, at 42 (reporting on the rise of
MCI's shares after the company’s disclosure of its founder and chairman suffering a heart
attack).
38. See Stephanie Clifford & Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Warns Wall Street: Stop
Spreading the False Rumors, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2008, at C1 (“Rumors have long been a
part of Wall Street’s fabric, and to prove rumor-mongering is a difficult task, especially with
24-hour news and communications technology like instant messaging and text messaging.
But Wall Street executives insist that false information is permeating the marketplace as
never before.”).
39. Principle-based disclosure under the guidance of the SEC is to be distinguished with
rigid line-item disclosure, which is useful for objective matters like employee headcount and
company addresses, but less useful for subjective issues like the material private matters of
executives. Principle-based disclosure necessarily allows for greater flexibility due to the
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framework is arguably most cost-effective 40 and conducive 41 to an
efficient, fair market. 42
A.

A Growing and Diverse Investor Base

In the latter half of the 20th Century, the number of securities investors
in the United States grew significantly, and it continues to grow among
unsophisticated individual investors. 43 This growth of the investor base is
important to the issue of more executive disclosure because a growing
investor base of unsophisticated investors makes more disclosure as a
regulatory safeguard increasingly relevant; 44 and consequentially, the

varying significance of each CEO in relation to their companies. In 2006, the SEC adopted
principle-based disclosure changes concerning executive compensation. Press Release,
SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executive
Compensation
and
Related
Matters
(July
26,
2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-123.htm [hereinafter SEC, Changes to Executive
Compensation Disclosure]; see also Michael Bloomberg & Charles Schumer, Sustaining
New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services Leadership, at 89 (McKinsey & Co.
report,
2007),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf
(“Nevertheless, reliance on principles and judgment over rules and the elimination of
unnecessary differences in standards (provided that the integrity of the standards is not
diminished) are two of the themes that should underpin the call for change for many aspects
of the US regulatory environment.”).
40. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 716 (“Disclosure duties reduce
their information gathering costs. Restrictions on fraud and manipulation simultaneously
lower information traders’ cost of verifying the credibility of information, and improve their
ability to make accurate predictions.”).
41. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy,
Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 199200 (2005) (noting that making changes within the existing federal securities law regime
can minimize costs); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV.
789, 793 (2002) (stipulating that costs are inherent to changes in legal rules); see also SEC,
Disclosures to Investors, supra note 29 (discussing how clarifying existing rules to account
for changes in the investing and technological landscape is cost-effective).
42. See, e.g., Press Release, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Self-Regulators
Warn Against Spreading False Rumors and Other Abusive Market Activity (Mar. 31, 2008),
available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2008NewsReleases/P038211
(reminding companies of NYSE prohibitions on rumors that affect market conditions); Press
Release, SEC, Securities Regulators to Examine Industry Controls Against Manipulation of
Securities Prices Through Intentionally Spreading False Information (July 13, 2008),
available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008140.htm (warning against the adverse
impact of unregulated information sources).
43. Cheney, supra note 31.
44. Historically, courts, lawmakers and regulators have focused on protecting the
individual investor. See, e.g., Schlesinger Inv. P’ship v. Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739, 743 (2d
Cir. 1982) (“The Williams Act was meant to protect the ordinary investor.”); H.R. REP. NO.
73–85, pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (“The purpose of the legislation . . . is to protect the public with the
least possible interference to honest business.”).
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growing investor base also gives lawmakers and regulators greater political
capital to promulgate new disclosure requirements to uplift and sustain
individual investors’ confidence in the securities markets. 45
During the 1920s, approximately 20 million large and small
shareholders took advantage of post-war prosperity and set out to make
their fortunes in the stock market. 46 Fueled by easy credits, get-rich
schemes, and irrational exuberance, many investors jumped head-first into
an unregulated, dangerous marketplace. It is estimated that, of the $50
billion in new securities offered during this period, half became
worthless. 47 In 1929, the stock market crashed, losing over half of its
market capitalization in the span of a few weeks. 48 In the aftermath of the
Great Crash of 1929, the nation fell into the Great Depression, and the
world soon fell into an economic slump. Millions of jobs were lost, and
billions of dollars in equities evaporated.
While only about 20 million investors were invested in the stock
market in the 1920s, today that number is much larger. Recent reports have
shown that over half of American households are now invested in the stock
market either directly through personal brokerage accounts or indirectly
through retirement plans. 49 A majority of the investors in the early part of
the 20th century consisted primarily of the wealthy and financially
sophisticated; whereas today’s investor base is more economically-diverse
and less sophisticated. Moreover, these less sophisticated investors are
making investment decisions in the face of “mounting complexities of
global trends in business, markets and the economy.” 50 Just as doctors are
required to provide patients with ample material information so that
patients can exercise their judgment to provide informed consent in making
a medical decision, 51 public companies are required to provide investors
45. See John Marshall Cook, The Securities Enforcement and Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990: The Cost of Flexibility, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 359, 391 n.235 (1992) (“The concept
of market confidence revolves around the individual investors. If individual investors are
not confident that the market is running smoothly, they will be reluctant to invest.”).
46. SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity,
and
Facilitates
Capital
Formation,
available
at
http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
47. Id.
48. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 88-100 (Houghton Mifflin
Co. 1997) (1954).
49. Investment Company Institute, Half of America Households Own Equities, Nov. 10,
2005, available at http://www.ici.org/shareholders/dec/05_news_equity_rpt.html.
50. Pandit, supra note 36, at A11.
51. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr., 499 P.2d 1, 8 (Wash. 1972):
Informed consent, therefore, is the name for a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the
medical community in the exercise of reasonable care, would disclose to his
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with ample material information so that investors can exercise their
judgment in making an investment decision.
As with the genesis of federal securities law, the birth of a broader and
more diverse investor base has resulted in greater political will to enact
new legislation and regulations to protect unsophisticated investors in the
marketplace. 52 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 53 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) was
enacted in response to the wave of corporate scandals involving major
companies, such as Adelphia, Enron, Tyco International and WorldCom,
which decimated billions of dollars in market capitalization, destroyed
pension funds, and undermined public confidence in the securities
market. 54 Sarbanes-Oxley was one of “the most far-reaching reforms of
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt.” 55 More recently, in 2006, the SEC adopted new rules to
require more disclosure on executive compensation. 56 The rules were
adopted partially in response to scandals involving stocks-option
backdating by executives 57 and perceived excessive compensation
patient as to whatever grave risks of injury may be incurred from a proposed
course of treatment so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own
welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or
alternative treatment, or none at all, can, in reaching a decision, intelligently
exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the
probable benefits. Failure to impart such information to the patient is by the
great weight of authority deemed negligence rendering the physician liable for
injuries proximately caused thereby. (citation omitted).
52. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, pt. 2, at 5 (1934) (discussing the need to protect
individual investors in an increasing complex financial, economic system); H.R. REP. NO.
73–85, pt. 1, at 2 (1933) (“The purpose of the legislation . . . is to protect the public with the
least possible interference to honest business.”); Ralph K. Winter, On “Protecting the
Ordinary Investor,” 63 WASH. L. REV. 881, 882–83 (1988) (highlighting the protection of
ordinary investors as a primary goal of securities law).
53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
54. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 221, 225-28
(2004) (chronicling the major corporate scandals around the time of the collapse of Enron);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 922-27 (2003) (discussing the genesis of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act); cf. Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002
Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003) (positing that Congress acted in an imprudent and
reactionary manner when implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). See generally Brian Kim,
Recent Developments, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. LEGIS. 235 (2003) (providing an
overview of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
55. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES,
July 31, 2002, at A1.
56. See SEC Final Rule, Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 17
C.F.R. §§ 228-29, 232, 239-40, 245, 249, 274 (2006).
57. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., May 18,
2006, at A1 (“The analysis [here] bolsters recent academic work suggesting that backdating
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packages for executives. 58 Such rulemaking and legislation would have
been unlikely had the investors directly affected by the scandals not
consisted of a large number of middle-class households and unsophisticated
individual investors with faltering confidence in the marketplace. 59 In
2006, publicly traded U.S. companies accounted for over $12 trillion in
market capitalization; therefore, even “a small loss in investor confidence
can translate to a very large loss in social welfare.” 60
Additionally, the growing investor base and its growing demand for
more timely information have also spawned various sources for business
information. 61 As a result, there has been a proliferation of business
information sources from television to websites to blogs to satellite radio—
all dedicated to satisfying the growing demand for more information. 62
Unfortunately, not all of these alternative sources are as reliable for the less
sophisticated, growing investor base as regulated disclosure. 63
B.

The Rise of the Executive

More disclosure about public company executives is desirable in part
because the role—perceived or actual—of the executives, and particularly

was widespread, particularly from the start of the tech-stock boom in the 1990s through the
Sarbanes-Oxley corporate reform act of 2002. If so, it was another way some executives
enriched themselves during the boom at shareholders’ expense.”).
58. See SEC, Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 39 (“By
taking up these critical issues and addressing them in record time, the Commission has once
again shown its responsiveness to the continually evolving needs of American investors.”);
Raghuram G. Rajan & Julie Wulf, Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 1
(2006) (arguing against the perception of corporate perks as purely managerial excess);
David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior
Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211 (2006) (studying the association between CEO
perquisites, focusing on use of corporate planes, and shareholder returns).
59. See Cook, supra note 45, at 391 n.235 and accompanying text (arguing that
additional disclosure requirements will help boost investor confidence); Cunningham, supra
note 54, at 922-27 (postulating that public pressure on elected officials led to the swift
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
60. Howard H. Chang & David S. Evans, Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?,
REGULATION, Winter 2007/2008, at 48, 51.
61. See SEC, Disclosure to Investors, supra note 29 (“‘Ongoing developments in
technology have increased both the markets’ and investors’ demand for more timely
company disclosure on the Web . . . .’”).
62. See GIDEON HAIGH, FAT CATS: THE STRANGE CULT OF THE CEO 97 (2005) (“New
business media, like CNNfn, CNBC, and Bloomberg Television, seemed to be willing the
market higher on behalf of the eager new investment generation.”).
63. Compare Clifford & Anderson, supra note 38 (discussing the spread of rumors),
with infra Part II.C (discussing the benefits of regulated disclosure as a source of reliable
information in an environment with a myriad of information sources).
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the chief executive officer has transformed in the 21st century economy. 64
Many executives, namely CEOs, have become celebrities and acquired cult
status. Investing in securities, in some ways like sports, has become
quotidian activity for the masses. Like athletes, 65 CEOs are lionized or
denigrated for their successes and failures, often getting too much credit for
successes and too much blame for failures. 66 Compounding this perception
(or misperception), business news reporting has on some level become
more superficial and personality driven. Fifty years ago, the average
American might have been hard-pressed to name the CEO of General
Electric or General Mills. Today, many average Americans know of Steve
Jobs, 67 Howard Schultz, 68 Martha Stewart, 69 Warren Buffett, 70 and Bill
Gates. 71 For better or for worse, CEOs have become a greater factor in the
investment calculus of a growing investor base. During the 1990s, a
“survey found that 95 percent of respondents were influenced in stock

64. See HAIGH, supra note 62, at 95-98 (discussing the changed role and perception of
CEOs towards the end of the 21st century).
65. Id. at 8 (analogizing modern executives to sports stars).
66. See Narayana N. R. Murthy, Chairman, Infosys Technologies Ltd., Robert P.
Maxon Lecture at George Washington University: Good Corporate Governance—A
Checklist or a Mindset? 3 (Feb. 6, 2006) (transcript available on the George Washington
School
of
Business
website
University
at
http://www.business.gwu.edu/global/MaxonLecture020606.pdf):
The decade of 1990s [sic] was the era of the stock-option-fattened, supermansuperwoman CEOs who could do no wrong in the eyes of their admirationheavy boards, and who were seen as demigods. Lax oversight by boards made
these CEOs more or less omnipotent, and corporate allies were required to
primarily serve their interests.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BYRON, TESTOSTERONE INC.: TALES OF CEOS GONE WILD ix-xiv
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2004) (discussing the bad behavior of certain public company
CEOs); Julie Creswell, Pressing for Independent Advice From Consultants, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2007, at C9 (acknowledging companies’ difficulties in finding independent
executive compensation advice because the industry is so incestuous).
67. See generally YOUNG & SIMON, supra note 2 (documenting the life of Steve Jobs,
the CEO of Apple Inc.).
68. See generally HOWARD SCHULTZ & DORI JONES YANG, POUR YOUR HEART INTO IT:
HOW STARBUCKS BUILT A COMPANY ONE CUP AT A TIME (Hyperion, 1997) (chronicling the
creation of Starbucks by its founder and CEO, Howard Schultz).
69. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BYRON, MARTHA INC.: THE INCREDIBLE STORY OF
MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMEDIA (2002) (discussing the story of Martha Stewart, the
CEO of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia Inc.).
70. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, BUFFETT: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN
CAPITALIST (1995) (chronicling the life of Warrant Buffett, CEO and founder of Berkshire
Hathaway).
71. See generally STEPHEN MANES & PAUL ANDREWS, GATES: HOW MICROSOFT'S
MOGUL REINVENTED AN INDUSTRY—AND MADE HIMSELF THE RICHEST MAN IN AMERICA
(1993) (discussing the story of Bill Gates, co-founder and former CEO of Microsoft).
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selection by the CEO’s profile and reputation.” 72 It would be hard for one
to imagine Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia without Martha Stewart, 73
Apple without Steve Jobs, 74 Starbucks without Howard Schultz, or
Berkshire Hathaway without Warren Buffett. Consequentially, it would be
hard—rightly or wrongly—for one to imagine the continued success of
these companies without their founders or CEOs. Many charismatic
executives, particularly CEOs, are no longer considered temporary
stewards of great enterprises. Instead, they are viewed as oracles, titans,
and alchemists, without whom their companies (and their companies’ stock
valuations) would perish. 75
As a result of the new heft of CEOs’ crowns in the modern economy,
their compensation has also increased. 76 “CEO compensation surged 535
percent in the 1990s” alone. 77 While the CEO role has become more
important to a growing number of investors, and while CEOs themselves
have been handsomely compensated for their new influence, 78 yet the SEC
72. HAIGH, supra note 62, at 98.
73. See Cynthia A. Caillavet, From Nike v. Kasky to Martha Stewart: First Amendment
Protection for Corporate Speakers' Denials of Public Criminal Allegations, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1033, 1039 n.36 (2004) (noting the vital role of Martha Stewart’s personage
to her company).
74. See Nocera, supra note 7 (discussing the affect of the rumors in 2008 about Steve
Jobs’s health and the lack of disclosure and statements from Apple on the market’s ability to
properly value the company’s shares and evaluate future prospects of the company).
75. See Murthy, supra note 66 (discussing good corporate governance). Compare
Nocera, supra note 7 (describing the indispensability of Steve Jobs to Apple), with Letter
from Warrant E. Buffet, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., to the Shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (February 2008), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters
/2007ltr.pdf:
Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we
have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of
dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been
running their businesses.
But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself
cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain
surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its
future. The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count,
though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name
its CEO.
76. See HAIGH, supra note 62, at 11 (discussing astronomical growth in executive
compensation during the 1990s partially as a result of the increased use of stock options as a
form of compensation); Rajan & Wulf, supra note 58 (finding it incorrect to treat
managerial perks solely as excess compensation); Yermack, supra note 58 (discussing
perquisites of CEOs, specifically their personal use of company planes).
77. HAIGH, supra note 62, at 11.
78. See Yermack, supra note 58 (discussing the largess of executive compensation
packages and perks despite inferior shareholder returns).
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has not meaningfully updated the regulations to reflect the new reality by
calling for more material disclosure from these executives. 79 Such
heightened status from the investing public should also come with
heightened accountability to the investing public, and sensible additional
disclosure from public company executives would be a responsible step in
that direction. Therefore, current rules or existing practices under current
rules must be redesigned for the new reality to provide for more
transparency and accountability in the executive suites. 80
C.

Regulated Disclosure: Efficient and Fair

If more disclosure about executives is desirable and needed, regulated
principle-based disclosure under the current framework is arguably most
efficient and fair, despite the proliferation of alternative information
sources. 81 Regulated disclosure would allow the most accurate information
(due to fear of liability) to be disseminated simultaneously to the largest
number of people and create uniformity of process. 82 In 2000, the SEC
promulgated Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”). Reg FD was
promulgated to address the problem of selective disclosures by companies
so that material information becomes available to the public simultaneously
or promptly after it has been disclosed to selected parties. 83
Some would argue that additional disclosure is not required because
modern media will shed more light and scrutiny on public company
executives. 84 The proliferation of blogs, perpetual news cycles, business
79. See Nocera, supra note 7, at C1 (“There are no hard and fast rules about how and
when companies need to disclose information about the health of their chief executives. . . .
No company has ever been held to account by the S.E.C. for failing to disclose information
about its chief executive’s health . . . .”).
80. See generally John Schwartz, Transparency, Lost in the Fog, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/business/yourmoney
/08fog.html (discussing the lack of understandable disclosure regarding executive
compensation).
81. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 733-34 (1984) (advocating for mandatory disclosure
as a means of minimizing wasteful resource spending in data gathering); Goshen &
Parchomovsky, supra note 14, at 738 (“Mandatory disclosure duties reduce the cost of
searching for information.”).
82. See Nocera, supra note 7, at C1 (providing examples of varying disclosure practices
by companies regarding the health of their executives).
83. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(adopting the new SEC rules).
84. For example, Dealbook, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/, and Dealbreaker,
http://dealbreaker.com, cover rumors in the marketplace and the comings and goings of
CEOs. In 2007, Dealbreaker released the golfing habits and scores of then Merrill Lynch
CEO,
Stanley
O’Neal.
Posting
of
Bess
Levin
to
Dealbreaker,
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news channels, corporate websites, and chat rooms has undoubtedly created
more scrutiny for public company executives. 85 However, absent regulated
disclosure, information of varying quality 86 and relevance 87 will be
disseminated sporadically and selectively, thereby creating information
uncertainty in the marketplace that will result in pricing inefficiencies. 88
Principle-based regulated disclosure of information about executives, like
other information required under the current federal framework, allows all
investors to receive a reasonable modicum of high-quality information at
the same time without regard for connections, wealth, size, or buying
power; and it creates a uniform process for disclosing such private matters
consistent with the SEC’s promulgation of Reg FD. 89 Because each

http://dealbreaker.com/2007/10/stan_oneal_has_got_his_priorit.php (Oct. 26, 2007, 14:37
EST) (displaying the dates and scores of Stanley O’Neal’s golf outings).
85. See, e.g., Clifford & Anderson, supra note 38 (examining rumor-spreading on Wall
Street); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Psst! Hear the Rumor of the Day?, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008,
at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/08/business/08sorkin.html?
_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin (discussing the spreading of rumors).
86. In the absence of regulated disclosure, rumors and less reputable information can
carry greater weight and lack a meaningful counter-weight, such as disclosure through the
SEC to refute them, thereby resulting in serious adverse effects on the marketplace.
Moreover, principle-based disclosure regulations can serve as a powerful signaling
mechanism for the market in instances where a company lacks disclosure about certain
adverse events or risks. For example, assuming that the SEC articulated the principle that
companies must disclose when CEOs are diagnosed with cancer, the absence of such
disclosure by companies should comfort investors that are concerned about a cancerstricken CEO. See Clifford & Anderson, supra note 38, at C1, C3 (“Rumors [which] have
long been a part of Wall Street’s fabric, and to prove rumor-mongering is a difficult task,
especially with 24-hour news and communications technology like instant messaging and
text messaging. . . . Since Wall Street firms are highly leveraged businesses that need
outside financing, confidence is crucial, and rumors can overshadow the strength of their
businesses, executives say.”); Matthew Karnitschnig & Susanne Craig, Fed Acted on
Lehman Rumor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2008, at C1 (“In an apparent attempt to prevent a
repeat of the cascading rumors that helped sink Bear Stearns Cos., the Federal Reserve last
month quietly called one major bank to see if it had pulled a credit line from Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc., people familiar with the matter said.”).
87. The advent and proliferation of business weblogs have led to coverage for both
meaningful as well as trivial matters concerning executives. For example, in 2008, the
weblog, Dealbreaker.com, reported the golf handicap of some of Wall Street’s top CEOs.
See When Executives Hit the Links: Does Golf Affect Stock Prices?,
http://dealbreaker.com/2007/07/when_executives_hit_the_links.php (July 9, 2007, 14:47
EST) (discussing the possible relationship between a CEO’s golf score and the company’s
change in stock price).
88. See False Report Sends UAL Shares Plunging, Posting of Micheline Maynard to
Dealbook, N.Y. TIMES, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/false-report-sendsual-shares-plunging/ (Sept. 8, 2008, 12:05 EST) (“Shares of United Airlines plunged
Monday morning when a false rumor swept financial markets that the struggling carrier had
filed for bankruptcy protection.”).
89. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, supra note 83 (adopting new rules
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company and each executive is unique, principle-based regulated disclosure
provides flexibility to the companies to decide what disclosure is
appropriate. 90
Aside from fairness and efficiency, there are collateral benefits of
regulated disclosure. One benefit is that it can result in more efficient use
of resources in the greater marketplace by reducing information-gathering
costs, which some argue creates no additional value to the marketplace. 91
Another benefit of regulated disclosure is that as companies become more
aware of certain material, such as private matters concerning their
executives, they may improve their succession planning, when appropriate.
Finally, another benefit of regulated disclosure is that it may de-stigmatize
certain human conditions to the extent that executives with these conditions
continue to thrive in their roles post-disclosure. 92
D.

The Senile Sage & The Mad Queen

While the foregoing arguments advocating more disclosure
concerning public company executives may be persuasive, it is instructive
to examine the issue of such disclosure in the realm of two hypothetical
CEOs to highlight the practical implications and difficulties surrounding
the issue. The following two characters are fictitious but based on
composites of real world executives.
1.

The Senile Sage

Winston B. Welchers (a.k.a. Mr. W) is the chief investment officer,
chief executive officer, and chairman of Orange Inc., a holding company
that owns subsidiaries that engage in a wide range of diverse businesses,
from furniture stores to oil storage to gold mining. Orange Inc. also owns
over one hundred insurance and reinsurance entities. Corporate returns and

that address the issue of selective disclosure of material, non-public information).
90. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the meaning of “material” for federal securities
laws).
91. See Coffee, supra note 81, at 733–34 (1984) (postulating that trading gains do not
create additional real wealth, while information gathering “consumes real resources.”);
Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393-400 (1980) (proposing a model “in which there is an
equilibrium degree of disequilibrium: prices reflect the information of informed individuals
(arbitrageurs) but only partially, so that those who expend resources to obtain information
do receive compensation”).
92. For example, a CEO who is battling cancer, yet continues to thrive in her position,
post-diagnosis and post-disclosure, may remove some of the stigma associated with cancer
survivors serving and succeeding as senior executives.
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equities returns on Orange Inc. have bested the S&P 500 Index 93 in
eighteen of the past twenty years. Mr. W is lauded as an oracle and
innovator for his equity investments and his ability to cut costs and create
organic growth in his subsidiaries. Stock analysts often speak of the “W
premium” placed on Orange Inc.’s stock simply because of Mr. W’s
presence at the helm. 94 Mr. W is seventy-seven years old and many expect
him to step aside very soon. However, Mr. W has no intention of retiring
until he is incapable of doing his job. Because of Mr. W’s past and
continued success, no clear succession plan has been implemented, and he
is under little pressure to implement one. 95
Recently, blogs and chat rooms became abuzz with rumors that Mr. W
was diagnosed with early symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease last year. The
rumors persisted for several days, causing Orange Inc.’s stock to drop
precipitously. After eight days of rumor, innuendo, and speculation, the
Wall Street Journal reported that the company confirmed that Mr. W was
indeed suffering from early dementia and would step down immediately.
The story also indicated that board of directors and senior management of
the management had only confirmed Mr. W’s illness in the past two days.
Upon the break of the story, Orange Inc. lost 25% of its market
capitalization as investors fled over uncertainty about the company’s future
leadership. Within two weeks, five class action lawsuits were filed and the
SEC, the Department of Justice, and the State Attorneys General from five
states all commenced formal investigations.
2.

The Mad Queen

Mary Gigs McQueen (a.k.a. Mrs. Q) is the founder, chief technology
officer, and chief executive officer of MQ Enterprises Inc., an integrated
media, technology, and merchandising company. MQ Enterprises produces
magazines, television shows, household items, and consumer electronics
under the “Q” brand. Last year, the company had over ten billion dollars in
total revenue. Mrs. Q is lauded as a lifestyle and technology visionary with

93. See Standard & Poor’s 500-stock Index (S&P 500), MORGAN STANLEY,
http://www.morganstanleyindividual.com/customerservice/dictionary/default.asp?letter=S#I
DAT4GPD (as of January 31, 2009).
94. It is widely believed in the investing world that certain CEOs, by their mere
reputation, add value or a premium to their company’s stock price. See, e.g., EMILY ROSS &
ANGUS HOLLAND, 100 GREAT BUSINESSES AND THE MINDS BEHIND THEM 271 (Sourcebooks,
Inc. 2006) (2004) (“Berkshire Hathaway has a significant Buffett premium built into [its]
price.”).
95. See Geraldine Fabrikant, A Maestro of Investments in the Style of Buffett, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at C1 (discussing the difficulties in replacing an executive who acts
both as chief executive officer and chief investment officer).
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a Midas touch. Her face graces the cover of every issue of her three
magazine publications and she hosts two television shows. Additionally,
the “Q” digital entertainment player was lauded as a revolutionary product
that created a two billion dollar portable digital entertainment market.
Recently, MQ Enterprises saw its stock plummet forty percent based
on some news about Mrs. Q. According to news reports, last year Mrs. Q’s
husband, Mr. Q, filed for divorce and requested sole custody of their two
young sons. In sealed court papers concerning the divorce and custody
proceedings that recently leaked online, it is alleged, inter alia, that Mrs. Q
used cocaine, was questioned by the U.S. Attorney as part of an insider
trading investigation, and has been diagnosed with ovarian cancer. 96
Additionally, court documents reveal that Mrs. Q has substantial holdings
through intricate partnerships in some of MQ Enterprises’ chief
competitors and has allegedly used business ideas, including those for
critical patents, of her husband without giving him proper credit. 97 As part
of the divorce settlement, Mr. Q is demanding half of Mrs. Q’s majority
stake in MQ Enterprises, which could change control of the company. 98
None of the foregoing was previously known to the company’s board of
directors or senior management. The New York State Attorney General
has launched an investigation into any potential wrongdoing by Mrs. Q and
MQ Enterprises.
While the foregoing scenarios about Mr. W and Mrs. Q may seem
implausible, the individual circumstances of each scenario are not only
plausible, but likely exist or have occurred in the business world. In 2003,
the ubiquitous Martha Stewart, the then-CEO of Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc., was charged for making materially false statements of
fact regarding her sale of ImClone securities to sustain the market value of
her company. 99 In 2004, Charles Bell, the newly elected CEO of
McDonald’s Corporation, resigned after being diagnosed with cancer and
died shortly thereafter. 100 In 2007, the career of John Browne, the CEO
96. See generally W. Bruce Johnson, Robert P. Magee, Nandu J. Nagarajan & Harry A.
Newman, An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths:
Implications for the Managerial Labor Market, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151 (1985) (studying the
association between unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives and the common
stock price of their respective corporations).
97. See generally Liu & Yermack, supra note 23 (discussing the impact of securities
transactions by CEOs on the performance of their companies).
98. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 21, at 2D (highlighting the advantages of a CEO
disclosing personal reasons, such as a divorce settlement, to sell stock in his company).
99. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
100. Press Release, McDonald’s Corporation, McDonald’s Former President and CEO
17,
2005),
Charlie
Bell
Dies
of
Cancer
(Jan.
http://mcdonaldsemail.com/corp/news/corppr/2005/cpr_01162005.html.
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who turned British Petroleum PLC into one of the world's most valuable oil
companies, came to an unceremonious end after a British court allowed a
United Kingdom newspaper group to publish a set of articles about the
executive's long relationship with a young man. 101 The hypothetical and
the real world cases both illustrate that the current rules or traditionallyaccepted practices under the current rules could be enhanced by requiring
additional disclosures from public company executives. 102
III. THE GENERAL DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
Congress built the SEC on the excesses of the Roaring Twenties and
on the ruins of the Great Depression by enacting two pieces of landmark
legislation: the Securities Act of 1933 103 (the “Securities Act”) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 104 (the “Exchange Act”). The chief
purpose of the Securities Act is “to provide full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through
the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other
purposes.” 105 The Securities Act requires the registration of any offer and
sale of securities using the “means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce.” 106 The Securities Act, through the
registration process, attempts to ensure that investors receive truthful,
accurate, and material information about the issuer and the securities being
offered by mandating certain line item disclosures 107 and more meaningful
narrative disclosures through Regulation S-K. 108 Whereas the Securities
Act governs the issuance of securities, the Exchange Act governs the

101. MacDonald et al., supra note 22 at A1.
102. It is worth noting that, had there been stronger executive disclosure requirements in
place at the respective times of our hypothetical and real-world cases, the impact of those
events may not have been softer or different save for a temporal difference. Mrs. Stewart’s
company’s stock would have dropped upon the news of her charges regardless of whether
the news came from company disclosures or from media outlets. Nonetheless, regulated
disclosure would result in better corporate governance, which is in part about being
forthright on a timely basis with shareholders and with the marketplace regardless of the
consequences.
103. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2000) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 1,
48 Stat. 74).
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mm (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, §
1, 48 Stat. 881).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000) (originally enacted as Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 1, 48
Stat. 74).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2008).
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subsequent trading and sales of those securities. 109 The Exchange Act,
through its broad anti-fraud provision 110 and its periodic reporting
requirements, 111 attempts to ensure that investors in the secondary market
for securities receive truthful, accurate, and material information about the
issuer and the securities being offered. While the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act both require some disclosure about management executives
and other significant employees, 112 certain types of private, material
information, such as those involving our hypothetical CEOs Mr. W and
Mrs. Q, are not likely to be disclosed under traditional disclosure practice
because the SEC has never taken enforcement action or issued guidance
concerning the disclosure of private facts, such as serious illness. 113
A.

Disclosure and Fraud Under the Securities Act

The Securities Act requires that most public offerings of securities in
the United States undergo a registration process with the SEC. 114 As part
of the process, the issuer publicly files a registration statement with the
SEC. 115 The registration statement and the accompanying prospectus must
include certain disclosures outlined in the registration form itself and in
Regulation S-K. 116 In terms of disclosure about company executives and
other significant employees, the SEC requires a brief summary of their
experiences and backgrounds as well as of related party transactions and
legal proceedings. 117 Nonetheless, there are no explicit requirements to
disclose private, material matters, such as serious illness 118 or significant
changes in personal financial situation. 119 Moreover, decades of disclosure
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-mm (2000) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, §
1, 48 Stat. 881).
110. See supra Part III.B (discussing Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act).
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1) (requiring
public companies to “keep reasonably current the information and documents required to be
included in or filed with an application or registration statement” required by Section 12 of
the Exchange Act).
112. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (2008) (requiring the disclosure of a company’s directors,
officers, and certain key employees).
113. See Elkind, supra note 6 (“The SEC requires that any public company disclose
material information to investors so that they can include it in their calculation of whether to
buy or sell a stock. But there are no specific guidelines governing health issues, and the
SEC has never taken action against a company in this area.”).
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2000) (outlining the information required for registration).
115. Id.
116. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2008).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401 (2008).
118. See Glenn, supra note 25, at 541-42 (noting the absence of clearly settled federal
law mandating the disclosure of executive illness).
119. See, e.g., Yung, supra note 21, at 2D (describing the disclosure by a CEO that he
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practice traditionally have not resulted in the disclosure of such private,
material matters. 120
In addition to the explicit disclosure requirements, disclosure resulting
from the Securities Act also arises because of its antifraud provisions under
Sections 11, 12, and 17. Section 11 of the Securities Act creates liability
for registration statements that “contain an untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” 121 A finding of
liability is likely for the issuing company in the event that there are
materially false statements or omissions in the registration statement
because the issuing company is strictly liable for such false statements or
omissions. 122 Under Section 11, a plaintiff does not have the burden of
proving reliance on the materially false statement or omission, and the
defense cannot use the absence of such reliance as an affirmative
defense. 123
Section 12 of the Securities Act broadens the scope of liability to
cover communications made outside the registration statement in
connection with a securities offering. 124 Section 12 makes liable any
person who offers or sells a security “by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading[.]” 125 Unlike Section 11, Section 12 offers an affirmative
defense for parties that “did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known, of such untruth or omission.” 126
Section 17 of the Securities Act is the general antifraud provision that
governs all securities transactions—public and private—and serves as a

sold stock in his company to pay a divorce settlement).
120. Cf. Elkind, supra note 6 (“The SEC requires that any public company disclose
material information to investors so that they can include it in their calculation of whether to
buy or sell a stock. But there are no specific guidelines governing health issues, and the SEC
has never taken action against a company in this area.”).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (2008).
122. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (Liability
against the issuer of a security is virtually absolute. . . .”); Degulis v. LXR Biotechnology,
Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1301, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Sections 11 and 12(2) provide for strict
liability. . . .”); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1427, 1434 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (“[P]laintiffs need only show a material misstatement or omission to establish their
prima facie case.”).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1998).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (2008) (covering liabilities arising from prospectuses and
communications).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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shield for purchasers and a sword against sellers. 127 Section 17(q) states
that:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any
securities or any security-based swap agreement (as defined in
section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [15 USCS §
78(c)]) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails,
directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser. 128
The elements of proof under Section 17 are similar to those of its more
prominent regulatory cousin, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 129 which
was based in part on Section 17. 130 As a result, many plaintiffs join their
Section 17(a) actions with Section 10(b) actions. 131 However, it should be
noted that there are meaningful differences between Section 10(b) and
Section 17(a). Namely, scienter is necessary in actions under Section 10(b)
and Section 17(a)(1), 132 but not required in actions under Sections 17(a)(2)
and 17(a)(3). 133
B.

Disclosure and Fraud Under the Exchange Act
The Exchange Act requires, inter alia, that “[c]ompanies with more

127. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (2008).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (2008).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2008); see infra Part III.B.
130. See Harry S. Gerla, Issuers Raising Capital Directly From Investors: What
Disclosure Does Rule 10b-5 Require?, 28 J. CORP. L. 111, 115 (2002) (“Rule 10b-5 was
copied from section 17.”).
131. See Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Perhaps
the main reason for the somewhat awkward development of the law under § 17(a) of the
1933 Act is the fact that it has traditionally lived in the shadow of another area of securities
law: Rule 10b-5.”); Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571, 578 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (“[P]laintiffs
have often ‘boot-strapped’ § 17(a) allegations to their 10b-5 claims.”).
132. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that scienter is
required for 10(b) actions); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that
scienter is required for 17(a)(1) actions).
133. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that scienter is not necessary
for 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) actions).
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than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more than 500
owners must file annual and other periodic reports” and make them
available to the public. 134 This requirement also extends to companies that
are listed on the national securities exchanges. 135 Required reports, such as
10-Ks, 10-Qs and 8-Ks, are often incorporated by reference into the
registration statement and prospectus in the event of a securities offering
and become part of the offering documents. 136
In addition to the bright-line disclosure requirements, the Exchange
Act also encourages disclosures through a broad antifraud provision under
Rule 10b-5, which states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 137
Generally, to prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant acted with scienter in making the false statement or omission
of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a security which
caused the plaintiff economic loss after the plaintiff justifiably relied on
such statements and omissions. 138 Since its promulgation in 1942, the
134. SEC,
The
Laws
That
Govern
the
Securities
Industry,
http://sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2008); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1
(2001) (exempting issuer from registration requirements if total assets do not exceed $10
million).
135. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994) (requiring
companies registered on a national securities exchange to file reports with the SEC and the
exchange); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1994) (outlining the
requirements to register a security on a national securities exchange).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1994) (requiring the filing of annual reports and other
information as prescribed by the SEC rules and regulations); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1
(outlining the periodic disclosure requirements of Exchange Act registered companies); 17
C.F.R. § 249.310 (Exchange Act Form 10-K),17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (Exchange Act Form
10-Q); 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (Exchange Act Form 8-K).
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
138. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (“[T]he action’s
basic elements include . . . scienter.”); San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit
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scope of the rule has been greatly expanded by the lower courts. 139 Many
securities law practitioners and scholars consider it to be the most
important liability rule—a supernova in the securities laws universe. 140
C.

What is “Material”?

Looming prominently in the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws is the specter of materiality. What is “material”? In
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the leading case on the subject, the
Supreme Court held that:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote . . . . Put another way, there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the “total mix” of information made available. 141
This definition was later broadly adopted for securities law purposes
in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson. 142 Because of the “total mix” concept in the
definition of materiality, each misstatement and omission is generally
considered on an individual basis in light of the specific facts and
circumstances surrounding it. Questions of materiality usually require
juries to make “delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable
investor’ would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those
inferences to him.” 143 Nonetheless, case law in this area has created some
Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 75 F.3d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[A]
plaintiff must plead that the defendant made a false statement or omitted a material fact,
with scienter, and that plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s action caused plaintiff injury.”);
Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The elements of a Rule 10b-5
cause of action are: (1) the defendant made a false statement or omission of material fact,
(2) with scienter, (3) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied, and (4) that proximately
caused the plaintiff's damages.”).
139. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818-35 (2002) (alluding to the expansion
of the rule and its jurisprudence).
140. See, e.g., William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on
Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule
10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1217-71 (1981) (highlighting the growing number of
actions under Rule 10b-5); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and
Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 36770 (1995) (critiquing the wide reach and impact of the application of Rule 10b-5).
141. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976).
142. 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting the previously mentioned definition of
“material” in a securities law context).
143. TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 450; see also John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality:
The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 4548 (1998) (discussing the difficulties and subjectivity involved in determining materiality).
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interpretative guidance.
For one, some courts have held that if the alleged misstatement or
omission is clearly insignificant, then it would be considered immaterial as
a matter of law. 144 This can be the case where the alleged misstatement or
omission “present[s] or conceal[s] such insignificant data that, in the total
mix of information, it simply would not matter.” 145 In terms of
significance, and materiality as a matter of law, some courts are of the view
that actionable statements need some level of specificity and not only be
puffery. 146 “Alleged misrepresentations can be immaterial as a matter of
law if they . . . are so vague and of such obvious hyperbole that no
reasonable investor would rely upon them.” 147 Therefore, customary
statements by company officials such as “our core metrics remain strong,”
“we are always looking for potential acquisitions,” and “we [continue] to
be focused on growth,” are generally considered mere puffery. 148
Additionally, some courts have held that alleged misstatements or
omissions are not materially misleading if the market possesses the correct
information. 149 For example, if a company executive in an interview fails
to fully describe a topic related to the company, such a misstatement or
omission may not be material if the company has made available more
complete and correct information on that topic as part of its periodic filings
with the SEC. 150 Similarly, an inadvertent misstatement of a widelyknown, verifiable fact may not be actionable since corrective mechanisms
exist in the markets. 151

144. See, e.g., Recupito v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 (D. Md.
2000) (“[I]f the alleged misstatements or omissions ‘are so obviously unimportant to an
investor that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality, the court may
rule them immaterial as a matter of law.’” (quoting Klein v. Gen. Nutrition Cos., 186 F.3d
338, 342 (3d Cir. 1999))); cf. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162-63 (2d Cir.
2000) (reversing a district court decision for determining immateriality as a matter of law
based on a single data point).
145. Chambers v. AMDOCS Ltd., 390 F.3d 542, 548 (8th Cir. 2004).
146. See, e.g., In re N. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 466 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (“[S]ingle, vague statement[s] that are essentially mere puffery.”); City of Monroe
Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 671 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 936 (2005) (holding that vague statements not subject to verification by proof are
generally deemed non-actionable puffery).
147. Chambers, 390 F.3d at 548.
148. Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 869-70 (5th Cir. 2003).
149. See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 368
(5th Cir. 2004) (holding that publicly available information filed with the SEC served as a
corrective mechanism for alleged misstatements).
150. See Ieradi v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 230 F.3d 594, 599-600 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that
failure to disclose certain terms of significant contracts is not material when disclosure in
the company’s 10-Q alludes to such terms).
151. See id.
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Similarly, some courts have held that alleged misstatements and
omissions can be neutralized and negated by ample cautionary language in
disclosure documents; this is the so-called “bespeaks caution” doctrine. 152
Regulation S-K requires that periodic filings such as the annual report on
Form 10-K and the prospectuses contain, where appropriate, “risk factors”
relating to the company or its offering. 153 Public companies, in relying on
the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, include ample cautionary language in their
disclosure documents in the hope of shielding themselves from future
liability. While cautionary language can provide a shielding blanket for
public companies, the language must be specific and properly constructed
in order to be meaningful and effective. Broad sweeping cautionary
statements will offer little warmth against the cold stare of hindsight in a
civil action. Effective and meaningful cautionary language must be
sufficiently specific 154 and directed at forward-looking statements. 155
While the body of law since TSC Industries, Inc. has offered many
guideposts for gauging materiality, there still remains some difficulty and
subjectivity in the determination of materiality. 156 This lack of objective
clarity may be frustrating to some, but it may also be necessary because
each company is different; a determination of materiality must be examined
through the unique lens of each company.
152. See Halperin v. eBanker USA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 360-61 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that “cautionary language address[ing] the relevant risk directly” negates an
allegedly material omission); Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1120 (10th Cir.
1997) (same); Gasner v. Board of Supervisors, 103 F.3d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 1996) (same);
Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assocs., 45 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1413-15 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Rubinstein v.
Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (arguing that cautionary language might render
predictive statements immaterial but is not per se dispositive under the “bespeaks caution”
doctrine); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-73 (3d Cir. 1993)
(applying the “bespeaks caution” doctrine where cautionary language was tailored
specifically to address uncertainty forming the basis for plaintiffs’ claim).
153. Regulation S-K, Item 503, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2008).
154. See Grossman, 120 F.3d at 1120 (requiring sufficiently specific risk disclosures or
cautionary language to nullify any potentially misleading statements); In re Westinghouse
Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 707-08 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82
F.3d 1194, 1213-14 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine was not
applicable because of ambiguity in cautionary language); Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078,
1082 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine is only applicable where
the information in the document, taken as a whole, is sufficiently cautionary).
155. See, e.g., Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 948
(9th Cir. 2005) (“[E]xtension of the bespeaks caution doctrine to statements of historical fact
is inappropriate.”); EP Medsystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 874 (3d Cir.
2000) (“By its terms, the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine, like the safe harbor provision in the
Reform Act, is directed only to forward-looking statements.”).
156. See Fedders, supra note 143, at 46 (discussing the lack of clarity in framework for
determining materiality in the securities law context).
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D.

What Does This Mean for Mr. W, Mrs. Q, and Other Executives?

Based on the previous discussion of the general disclosure obligations
under the federal securities laws, it is not entirely clear what legal
consequences Mr. W and Mrs. Q would face as a result of their
misstatements and omissions. Arguably, Mr. W’s and Mrs. Q’s illnesses
and legal problems are of the type that “there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important,” and therefore are
material and should be disclosed for securities law purposes. 157 However,
“[n]o company has ever been held to account by the SEC for failing to
disclose information about its chief executive’s health[.]” 158 Furthermore,
since neither of their companies were aware of their respective private
issues, such material misstatements and omissions may not be actionable,
and investors will have nowhere in federal securities law to which they can
turn for their grievances. The scienter requirement under Section 10b-5
and Section 17(a)(1), 159 and the knowledge requirement under Section 12 160
may lead or have led companies to adopt a benign willful ignorance policy
toward the material, private acts of their executives—“speak no evil, hear
no evil, see no evil.”
Current federal securities laws along with historic and widelyaccepted practices under such laws offer little clear guidance as to what a
company should do, besides not disclose, when it comes to facts like those
involving Mr. W and Mrs. Q. 161 The absence of clarity under the current
regulatory model has created a dangerous opaqueness for the investing
public with disclosure practices varying from company to company: 162
When Intel . . . CEO Andy Grove was diagnosed with prostate
cancer in 1995, he made no formal disclosure—Grove chose to
write about it instead in a 1996 article for Fortune. On the other
157. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976).
158. Nocera, supra note 7 at C1.
159. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that scienter is required
for 17(a)(1) actions); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that
scienter is required for 10(b) actions).
160. 15 U.S.C. 77l (2006).
161. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 6 (reporting the troubling lack of SEC guidance on
material, private matters involving executives).
162. See Nocera, supra note 7, at C1 (“In 1995, when Andrew S. Grove, then the chief
executive of Intel, received a diagnosis of prostate cancer, he informed the company’s board
and management. But he never told the company’s shareholders . . . . On the other hand,
when Charles H. Bell received a diagnosis of colorectal cancer shortly after he became the
chief executive of McDonald’s in 2004, the company quickly released the news. Mr. Bell
resigned from the company that November, and died two months later.”); Elkind, supra note
6 (discussing Apple’s struggle with whether disclosure was required for CEO’s pancreatic
cancer diagnosis).
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hand, Berkshire Hathaway's Warren Buffett . . . issued a press
release in June 2000 days after he learned he would need surgery
to remove benign polyps along with part of his colon, even
though the procedure was considered routine. 163
The absence of clarity and guidance under current regulations has
essentially turned back the regulatory clock, retrofitting the philosophy of
caveat emptor for the philosophy of disclosure. 164 A new, workable model
approach that addresses the competing desires of the corporation, the
executives, and the investing public is needed. The following part proposes
one such model approach.
IV. A MODEL APPROACH
There is no pure solution in any realistic, workable approach for
additional executive disclosure of private, material facts. Good practical
solutions will likely be thematically inelegant, internally inconsistent, and
often cross-cutting. Weighing the executive’s desire for privacy against the
investing public’s thirst for more material information 165 is a delicate,
difficult, but necessary balance if capital markets are to function better.
However, the fulcrum of this balance is neither unique nor rare in modern
society. Consumers sacrifice personal privacy for the sake of market
efficiency and higher standards of living. 166 Every online transaction,
every direct deposit, and every credit card purchase is the result of a model
based on a careful balance between individual privacy and market
efficiency. In creating a workable model approach, privacy concerns must
be cautiously considered, and some flexibility and deference must be given
to companies as the facts and circumstances of each case are unique. The
model approach offered here is outlined by addressing three key questions:
(1) Who should disclose?; (2) What should be disclosed?; and (3) How to
disclose? As discussed in greater detail below, this Article advocates a
model approach that would first require principle-based disclosure by
senior executives of material private information to their board of directors
163. Elkind, supra note 6.
164. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A
fundamental purpose, common to [the federal securities laws], was to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”).
165. See SEC, Disclosure to Investors, supra note 29 (“Ongoing developments in
technology have increased both the markets and investors demand for more timely company
disclosure on the Web[.]”).
166. See JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL: HOW WE ARE SACRIFICING A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT IN EXCHANGE FOR SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE 94-112 (2007) (critiquing the tradeoff
of individual privacy for convenience in modern American life).
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or appropriate committee. Second, the approach requires that such
disclosure be made available to the investing public within the current
federal securities framework after the board independent of the disclosing
executive determines that such disclosure is material and should be
disclosed.
A.

Who Should Disclose?

The obligation to disclose material information should rest with all
executives and senior officers of the company. “Executive” and “senior
officer” in this instance means such persons as defined by Rule 16a-1(f)
under the Exchange Act as an “officer” of the company. 167 Rule 16a-1(f)
defines “officer” as
[A]n issuer's president, principal financial officer, principal
accounting officer (or, if there is no such accounting officer, the
controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a
principal business unit, division or function (such as sales,
administration or finance), any other officer who performs a
policy-making function, or any other person who performs
similar policy-making functions for the issuer. Officers of the
issuer's parent(s) or subsidiaries shall be deemed officers of the
issuer if they perform such policy-making functions for the
issuer. In addition, when the issuer is a limited partnership,
officers or employees of the general partner(s) who perform
policy-making functions for the limited partnership are deemed
officers of the limited partnership. When the issuer is a trust,
officers or employees of the trustee(s) who perform policymaking functions for the trust are deemed officers of the trust. 168
Admittedly, this class of persons obligated to disclose is both underinclusive and over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive because it fails to
capture certain influential and highly-compensated individuals that are not
senior officers but may have a material impact on the company. For
example, key creative talents in the entertainment divisions of
conglomerates and critical engineers of technology-intensive companies
would be excluded from making material disclosures. 169 On the flip-side, it
167. See Exchange Act Rule 16a-1(f), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (2008) (defining terms
relevant to Section 16 of the Exchange Act).
168. Id.
169. This approach is consistent with the SEC’s rules concerning executive
compensation disclosures. Under those rules the SEC, after significant pushback from
corporations, decided to exclude from the required compensation disclosures “employees
having no responsibility for significant policy decisions within the company, a significant
subsidiary, or a principal business unit, division or function would be excluded when
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is over-inclusive because it captures certain officers whose disclosures may
not have a material impact.
While our “senior officers” net inadvertently captures some small fish
and lets some big fish escape, it is nonetheless preferable because it is
faithful to the current framework. Working within the current framework
is operationally more feasible and less burdensome for companies because
it minimizes legal costs for compliance and adoption. 170 Since certain
disclosure is already required under federal securities laws from senior
officers, broadening the scope and depth of their existing disclosure would
be less burdensome than having additional requirements for new parties not
accustomed to making such disclosures. 171
B.

What to Disclose?

The disclosure of private information about anyone is a sensitive area
that must be given due consideration. 172 Disclosure of private information
about senior executives is arguably more sensitive because of the positive
and negative externalities that such information may have on a company’s
stock and the investments of individual investors. 173 Inappropriate amounts
of information and inappropriate types of information can obfuscate the
market’s ability to properly evaluate a company and can needlessly expose
an individual’s private matters to the public. 174 Under our model approach,
determining which employees are among the most highly compensated.” See SEC, Changes
to Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 39 (discussing important changes for
disclosure requirements and reasoning behind those changes).
170. See, e.g., Alstine, supra note 41, at 789-91 (examining the costs related to
companies complying with new regulations under modern rulemaking regimes).
171. In the lead up to the implementation of the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
companies spent billions of dollars trying to comply with the regulations. Those costs could
have been minimized had legislators made greater efforts to work within the existing system
to provide additional safeguards for the public. As a result, in the years following the
implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley, lawmakers continue to refine and amend the law to
achieve a better regulatory equilibrium. See, e.g., Chang & Evans, supra note 60, at 51
(“One study by Ivy Zhang estimated that the U.S. stock market lost $1.4 trillion in value,
which is over 10 percent of annual U.S. GDP, as a result of the legislative events leading up
to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. A ballpark estimate of the implementation costs of
Sarbanes-Oxley is around $100 billion so, assuming the $1.4 trillion figure is correct, most
of the estimated costs are indirect costs from the legislation.”).
172. See Joan MacLeod Hemingway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A
Proposal For Tailored Disclosures To Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 749, 764-70 (2007) (discussing the various difficulties, sensitivities, and
biases involved in making private facts concerning executives public).
173. See, e.g., Elkind, supra note 6 (discussing the tension between privacy and
shareholder interests in connection with disclosing an executives health conditions).
174. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual
Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose
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we assume that the SEC would provide principle-based guidance on the
types of events that should be disclosed if they are likely to have a material
impact. 175 As examples of such guidance, the SEC could state that where
an executive’s private acts could present a potential conflict with their
company’s interests then they should present such information to their
board, or the SEC could state that an executive’s diagnosis for a terminal
illness is information that should be disclosed to the board. But regardless
of the details of the underlying principles, a thematically-unified regulatory
approach would have the virtue of enhancing the overall consistency and
predictability of disclosures. 176 Moreover, once the marketplace adjusts
their disclosures to reflect the principles, industry standards will likely be
enhanced as companies adopt what they perceive as “best practices.”
As a baseline consideration, what should be disclosed is information
that is directly related to the executive deemed material for timely
disclosure by the company’s board of directors or delegated committee.
Examples of the type of information that should be disclosed about senior
executives are diagnoses of a fatal illness, 177 certain threatened criminal
investigations, and certain meaningful outside investments. 178 It should be
noted that many companies already have internal policies 179 that mandate

Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 142 (2007) ("Not all
information that is interesting to investors and analysts is material to the financial condition
of a company[.]").
175. Business leaders tend to favor a more flexible, principle-based regulatory regime,
like those in the United Kingdom, rather than a rigid rules-based regime. See Bloomberg &
Schumer, supra note 39, at 17 (“Business leaders increasingly perceive the UK’s single,
principles-based financial sector regulator—the Financial Services Authority (FSA)—as
superior to what they see as a less responsive, complex US system of multiple holding
company and industry segment regulators at the federal and state levels.”).
176. Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 39, at 106 (discussing the benefits from
certainty in the realm of enforcement from a unified regulatory scheme).
177. See Johnson, Magee et al., supra note 96, at 151-74 (“[C]ertain characteristics of
managerial employment arrangements and of the labor market for managers make
shareholder wealth dependent upon continued employment of an incumbent manager”); see
also Morten Bennedsen, Francisco Perez-Gonzalez, and Daniel Wolfenzon, Do CEOs
matter?,
available
at
http://www.mccombs.utexas.edu/faculty/Francisco.PerezGonzalez/valueceo.pdf (“[P]ersonal shocks that are the most. . . meaningful for CEOs. .
.[include] the death of children and spouses. . . .”).
178. For example, if an executive decides to invests his entire net worth in a vineyard,
his or shareholder should be made aware of such an investment to the extent that the board
determines that it will have a material impact on that executive’s ability to perform his or
her duties. See Liu & Yermack, supra note 23 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=970413 (studying
the impact of private investment decisions of CEOs on the performance of their companies).
179. See generally General Electric, Governance Principles (2008) available at
http://www.ge.com/company/governance/principles/
governance_principles08.pdf (containing principles relating to directorship); Time Warner
(2008),
available
at
Inc,
Corporate
Governance
Policy
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such disclosures and the SEC already requires the disclosure of certain
transactions by executives. 180 Codifying this principle and practice to make
such disclosures standard would lead to better corporate governance in the
marketplace.
Given our proposed approach, it is likely that certain information that
may have a material impact on the executive or the company should not
need to be disclosed. For example, a CEO with a seriously ill spouse or
child may be adversely affected in his capacity to serve optimally as a
senior officer. 181 However, the disclosure of a spouse or child’s serious
illness would likely fall outside the purview of required disclosure under
our model approach.
Distinction should be made between the
executive/principal and other parties because the executive is a duty-bound
senior officer of the company, while other parties, such as friends and
family members of the executive, are only tangentially connected to the
company. In most circumstances, disclosure from non-principals should
not be mandated as it may be too invasive regardless of the impact on the
related executive.
C.

How to Disclose?

Disclosure should be done via a two-step process. First, the disclosing
senior officer should disclose in a timely manner the private information to
the board of directors or the appropriate committee. 182 Second, once the
board determines that such information is material and should be made
available to the public, it should be timely disclosed within the existing
disclosure framework. 183
http://www.timewarner.com/corp/corp_governance/pdf/Corporate_Governance_Policy_020
8.pdf (“Corporate Governance Review and Disclosure”).
180. Regulation S-K requires executives to disclose transactions involving “related
persons, promoters, and certain control persons.” See 17 C.F.R. 229.404 (2008) (requiring
disclosure of certain relationships and transactions).
181. See Maremont, supra note 26, at A1 (reporting that a study which indicated a
decline in a company’s profitability following the death of its CEO’s spouse or child);
Bennedsen et al., supra note 177 (“[P]ersonal shocks that are the most . . . meaningful for
CEOs . . . [include] the death of children and spouses . . . .”).
182. All companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock
Market are required to have Audit Committees and Corporate Governance Committees
consisting entirely of independent directors to make objective decisions related to the
company and its executives. Such committees, or a special committee designated by the
board of directors, can weigh the materiality of the executive’s disclosure and determine
whether it merits disclosure to the public. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section
303A (addressing the corporate governance standards for listed companies); FINRA NASD
Manual, NASD Rule 4350 (“Audit committees are required to have a minimum of three
members and be comprised only of independent directors.”).
183. The second step admittedly gives the board great latitude in unveiling or shielding
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The first step of this process—disclosure to the board—already occurs
in many companies with good corporate governance and forthcoming
executives, so it should be minimally burdensome from an administrative
perspective. 184 Admittedly, the first step gives some deference to
executives and trusts that they will disclose certain private, personal
matters to the board in a timely manner. Given that executives under the
current regulatory regime already need to make similar disclosures, such
deference is not irrational. 185 Moreover, our model approach exists in the
context of principle-based guidance articulated by the SEC, and so
disclosing executives and their boards will have some direction on what
types of matters they should disclose.
The second step of this process—determination by the board—like the
first step, already takes place in some boardrooms in America. However,
disclosure guided by an SEC-articulated principle offers greater uniformity
and fairness in the marketplace and allows for the timely disclosure of
material information to the investing public. 186 The board or a designated
committee—duty-bound to the company and its shareholders 187 —should
make the decision independent of the relevant executive, 188 and that
executive should have no active influence over the decision. 189 Once the

an executive officer’s personal matters. However, presuming good corporate governance,
no panel or person is in a better position to make that determination on behalf of the
company and its shareholders than the independent members of the company’s board of
directors. See Fedders, supra note 143, at 46 (discussing the difficulties and subjectivity
involved in determining materiality).
184. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Internal Controls, 61 N.C. L. REV. 505, 513-14 (1983)
(describing the ease with which disclosures can be made); Steven Chasin, Insider v. Issuer:
Resolving and Preventing Insider Trading Compliance Policy Disputes, 50 UCLA L. REV.
859, 861-64 (2003) (discussing insider trading compliance policies).
185. Requiring executives to self-report to their management certain private matters may
lead to a difficult personal decision for the executive, but alternatives to self-reporting—
such as mandated disclosure or independent management investigation—are not costeffective and practical. Contra Hemingway, supra note 172, at 790-94 (proposing
mandatory disclosure and independent company investigation as a means to gather material,
disclosable information about executives).
186. See Sommer, supra note 184, at 513-17 (noting the importance of compliance
policies to relations with the SEC); Chasin, supra note 184, at 861-64 (discussing the harms
of ambiguous compliance policies).
187. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92, 98 (Del. 2007) (“It is well established that the directors owe fiduciary
obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”).
188. This is common practice in many companies especially when the audit committee,
compensation committee or a special committee is meeting on sensitive matters concerning
company executives. See NYSE Rule 303A.03 (requiring independent directors to meet
regularly without management to discuss affairs of the company).
189. See Hemingway, supra note 172, at 765-70 (highlighting various biases and
problems that make it less than optimal to have the relevant executive have influence over

2009]

DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE, MATERIAL MATTERS

415

decision to disclose is made, it should be done via the existing regulatory
framework. For example, a company, where appropriate, may disclose the
terminal illness of its CEO through a Form 8-K, a Form 10K, or through its
website. 190 Additionally, where appropriate, the company should also
include meaningful, specific narrative disclosure in the risk factor section 191
of its annual report on Form 10K. 192 For example, Martha Stewart
Omnimedia, Inc. includes in its publicly-filed annual report on Form 10-K
the following language in its risk factors:
Our success depends in part on the popularity of our brands and
the reputation and popularity of our founder, Martha Stewart, and
any adverse reactions to publicity relating to Ms. Stewart, or the
loss of her services, could adversely affect our revenues, results
of operations and our ability to maintain or generate a consumer
base. 193
This second step, like the first step, codifies the “best practices” in the
market and places the responsibility on the company’s management to
make the appropriate judgment regarding the executive’s private
information. Because each company, each executive, and each situation is
unique, some deference should be given to the business judgment of the
company’s management since they are often in the best position 194 to judge
how certain private matters of an executive is going to impact the
company. 195 Consistent with established law, companies—not regulators

the disclosure decision).
190. Consistent with current practice, flexibility should be given the company in terms of
how it chooses to disclose within the current regulatory framework. For example, an
executive’s initial diagnoses with colon cancer can be disclosed through both a Form 8-K
and the company’s website. Depending on timing, if additional information becomes
available, the company can include a risk factor in its annual report on Form 10-K speaking
to the executive’s diagnosis of cancer and its potential impact on the company. See SEC,
SEC Disclosures to Investors, supra note 29.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 229.305 (2008) (“Registrants shall provide, in their reporting currency,
quantitative information about market risk . . . .”).
192. Many companies include “key persons” risk factors that alert investors about the
company’s dependence on certain key personnel. Under our model approach, risks related
to certain private matters involving executives would similarly be disclosed in the annual
report. See, e.g., Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 19 (Feb. 29,
2008) (“Berkshire is dependent for its investment and capital allocation decisions on a few
key people.”).
193. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 12 (Mar.
17, 2008).
194. See Del. Gen. Corp. L. Sec. 141(a) (stating the responsibility of directors under
Delaware law to manage the operations and affairs of a company).
195. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1621–24 (2001)
(positing that deference to business judgment allows for flexible and meaningful corporate
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or judges—should initially decide with regulatory guidance what may be
material. 196
It is worth noting that under the proposed model approach no new
rules may need to be proposed; instead, existing rules and practices may
only need clarification. The absence of additional rules should minimize
compliance costs and make for swifter compliance to the new practice. 197
V.

CRITIQUES & CONCERNS

Rule proposals and guidance from administrative agencies usually
generate some critique and concern from implicated parties. Rule
proposals and guidance from the SEC that implicate the interests of
industry titans and personal privacy will likely generate much critique,
concern, and consternation. 198 Broadly, three chief categories of concerns
and critiques about requiring additional disclosures from public company
executives are the “status quo” critique, corporate concerns, and privacy
concerns.
A.

The Status Quo Critique

The “status quo” critique is in many ways a default and reflexive
response to new guidance or regulations from the SEC (or any regulatory
body). The critique often operates on two main strains, the sufficiency
strain and the extra-regulatory strain. The sufficiency strain argues that the
status quo of the existing framework is sufficient to deal with whatever
issues the new proposed regulations are meant to address. Polemically and
practically, the sufficiency strain goes along the lines of: “We don’t need
more rules. We need to properly enforce the rules that we have on the

governance by individual companies).
196. Under the “business judgment rule,” courts have often deferred to management on
business matters regardless of how problematic they may turn out to be in hindsight. See,
e.g., Gearhart Indus. Inc. v. Smith Int’l Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) (outlining the
business judgment rule); Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 185 A.2d 480, 482–83 (Del. 1962)
(detailing the ramifications of business judgment rule); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383
N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976) (stating the
business judgment rule).
197. See, e.g., Alstine, supra note 41, at 793 (“[A] legal system will incur costs simply in
adjusting to the existence of a new legal norm.”); Matwyshyn, supra note 41, at 199-202
(noting that making changes within the existing federal securities law regime can minimize
costs).
198. See SEC, SEC Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 39
(“With more than 20,000 comments, and counting, it is now official that no issue in the 72
years of the Commission's history has generated such interest.”).
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books.” 199 The extra-regulatory strain argues that the status quo of the
existing framework is adequate because the issues to be dealt with by the
proposed rules are fundamentally extra-regulatory issues that cannot be
properly addressed by more rules. Polemically and practically, the extraregulatory strain goes along the lines of: “We don’t need more rules. Let
the markets work.” 200 These are issues that can be better dealt with by the
market (or some extra-regulatory force).” 201 These two strains frequently
serve as the basis for interrelated corporate arguments that implicate
regulatory cost burdens on businesses and comparative advantage in the
presence of overregulation (which will be discussed in greater detail in the
next part). 202
While the duel-strained status quo critique may be perceived as
reflexive and shallow, it is not without merit. The sufficiency strain is
correct in postulating that existing securities regulations need more
vigorous enforcement and faithful compliance. 203 Some scholars and
industry experts have argued that the corporate debacles of
Enron,WorldCom, and their ilk came not only from rule-breaking, but from
a lack of enforcement, oversight, 204 and honest compliance. 205 Likewise,
the extra-regulatory strain is correct in postulating that there are certain
problems that may be better addressed with market or other extra199. See, e.g, Michelle Singletary, Another Lending Commission? Forget It—We Need
to Enforce Existing Laws, BOSTON GLOBE, April 27, 2008.
200. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (contending that absent mandatory
disclosure in securities laws, the market will reward or punish companies that disclose).
201. See, e.g., Chang & Evans, supra note 60, at 51 (“[T]here are a number of reasons to
believe that market solutions are pretty good at limiting corporate misbehavior—the recent
spate of corporate shenanigans notwithstanding—and that heavy-handed regulation and
zealous prosecution are a bit like using an elephant gun to shoot a tarantula.”).
202. See Alstine, supra note 41, at 793 (examining the legal costs in light of regulatory
change).
203. See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA L.J. OF CORP. L. 1, 21-37 (2003)
(explaining that the frauds that gave rise to Sarbanes Oxley may have been prevented
through better enforcement and proper adherence to the then-existing regulations).
204. Some scholars have suggested that the failures of Enron and other corporate
scandals of that period highlighted the shortcoming in the financial institution’s gatekeepers,
namely, auditors and attorneys. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and
Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 301-10, 34952 (2004) (examining the failure of the gatekeepers and the stricter liability standards
imposed as a result).
205. See Ribstein, supra note 203 (reviewing the issues with Enron and other corporate
frauds). See generally Pandit, supra note 36 (“An uneven application of regulations and
accounting standards in an environment where capital and talent are mobile and where
traditional classifications are being redefined has the potential to increase systemic risk.
Applying rules partially is not the second best option to applying them consistently.”).
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regulatory mechanisms. For example, while the SEC may require
additional disclosures on executive compensation, 206 meaningful and
understandable disclosure may not necessarily follow and will more likely
come through discussions within the industry and feedback from the
marketplace at large after the first cycle of disclosures. 207
While the status quo critique has much merit in its opposition to more
rules governing disclosure relating to executive officers, its arguments
come up short. While existing federal securities rules need more vigorous
enforcement and faithful compliance, from time to time, they also need to
be updated, amended, and supplemented to account for new developments
and practices in the marketplace. 208 “[T]he American economy does not
stand still, and neither should the rules that govern it. The evolution of
industries often warrants regulatory reform—to foster competition, lower
prices, or replace outdated oversight structures.” 209 Securities regulations,
being reactionary in nature, often play tortoise to the market hare,
especially in a globalized financial market—falling behind and needing a
market stumble to catch up. The global financial marketplace and exotic
financial products 210 have also diminished the strength and reach of federal
regulators who have limited resources and limited jurisdiction. 211 Federal

206. See SEC Final Rule, Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 17
C.F.R. § 228, 229 (2006); see also SEC, Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure,
supra note 39 (outlining the SEC’s adoption of principle-based disclosures for executive
compensation).
207. See Dash, supra note 1, at A1 (“But while all the new disclosure rules have resulted
in far more information, analysts say they still do not necessarily offer greater insight . . . .
Many shareholders say the new proxies require more work, not less, to decipher. Pay
consultants say some of the new data is so dizzying that they are not sure how to sift through
it; some charts even require another set of charts to interpret them.”).
208. See, e.g., Julia Werdigier, Paulson Calls for Strong Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, July
31,
2008
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/03/business/worldbusiness/03treasury.html
(reporting
U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s call for a new regulatory system, finding that the
current system is outdated and does not address the new innovations in the financial
market).
209. Senator Barack Obama, Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Renewing the
American
Economy
(March
27,
2008),
available
at
http://www.barackobama.com/2008/03/27/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_54.php.
210. See, e.g., Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, Containing Systemic Risk:
The Road to Reform The Report of the CRMPG III, 70-75 (Aug. 6, 2008) (calling attention
to the lack of risk monitoring and risk management regulations in an increasing complex
financial system).
211. See David Rothkopf, What Power Looks Like, NEWSWEEK (Int’l Ed.) Apr. 14, 2008,
at 38, available at http://news.uk.msn.com/newsweek.aspx?cp-documentid=7992352
(“[N]ational institutions are ineffective beyond their borders and international institutions
have not evolved as quickly as global markets, many retaining ownership and management
structures dating to the late 1940s with resources inadequate to many global challenges [.]”).

2009]

DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE, MATERIAL MATTERS

419

regulators at the SEC and the Federal Reserve during the credit crisis of
2007 and 2008 were ill-equipped under outdated regulatory framework to
prevent and address the crisis. 212 As result, various new proposals were
made by the US Treasury Department to address regulatory insufficiencies
in light of modern market conditions. 213
Generally, free markets work, albeit sometimes in a blunt and violent
manner. Yet, free markets can also work better and smoother with proper
incentives and refinements. While there are many market-based and extraregulatory cures to the securities market’s ills and defects, 214 those cures
are often imperfect and untimely, and need some motivation from the
government. Sometimes markets are self-reinforcing instead of selfcorrecting. Absent external pressures and incentives from regulators, it is
unlikely that private industry will impose meaningful higher standards and
checks on themselves or come together in a timely fashion to solve its own
shortcomings. 215 The threat of regulation or actual intervention from
government has in the past served as the impetus for industry self-reform or
corrective, systemic action. For example, in 2008, Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke urged J.P.
Morgan and other banks to act swiftly to purchase Bear Stearns in order to
stem a global financial catastrophe. 216 Such public-private collaboration in
the financial sector in such a context is more likely to happen at the urging
of government than profit-driven private enterprise. 217
212. See Werdigier, supra note 208 and accompanying text.
213. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 1 (Mar. 1, 2008) (“In
this report, Treasury presents a series of ‘short-term’ and ‘intermediate-term’
recommendations that could immediately improve and reform the U.S. regulatory
structure.”).
214. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2359-65, 2395-2400 (1998) (proposing marketbased alternatives rooted in state law and self-regulatory organization to the existing federal
securities law regime); Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453,
1453-58 (1997) (positing that that the stock exchange can serve as a primarily regulator of
the securities industry).
215. Because of greater public scrutiny—both regulated and not—some companies have
taken stricter position concerning the private behavior of their executives. Cf. Carol
Hymowitz, Personal Boundaries Shrink as Companies Punish Bad Behavior, WALL ST. J.,
June 18, 2007, at B1 (“As with politicians, today's ambitious business managers need to be
aware that their personal behavior will be as closely scrutinized and judged as their work
performance. Corporate directors are far less willing than they were a few years ago to look
the other way if an executive does something that threatens to embarrass a company.”).
216. See Bryan Burrough, Bring Down Bear Stearns, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2008, at 106
(chronicling the fall of Bear Stearns and the collaboration between federal regulators and
J.P. Morgan to purchase Bear Stearns to prevent a global financial crises).
217. See, e.g., id. (detailing how J.P. Morgan, absent the intervention and assistance of
federal regulators, was unwilling to assist in the bailout of Bear Stearns given the significant
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In the case of additional rules requiring more disclosure from
executive officers, the existing regulatory framework is lacking and extraregulatory solutions to potential problems are unlikely to bear fruit in the
near term. As previously discussed, existing rules and practices concerning
disclosure relating to executive officers leaves shareholders and the
marketplace vulnerable. 218 Moreover, there appears to be little incentive
and motivation in the near term for executive officers to make additional
personal disclosures. Executive accountability to a growing investor base
has not grown at the same rate as executive compensation. 219 Greater
rewards should arguably come with greater accountability and
transparency. 220 Absent governmental regulators, who is going to cause
CEOs and other industry titans to disclose what can be perceived as
personal foibles and conflicts material to the company and its
shareholders? 221 Therefore, in the area of executive officers’ disclosures,
new rules or reinterpretations of existing rules may be warranted given the
status quo.
B.

Corporate Concerns

Requiring additional disclosure from public company executives will
undoubtedly raise some corporate resistance. 222 Chiefly, companies,
executives, and their supporters will likely argue that the additional
regulations will impose unnecessary costs on the company 223 and could
risk involved in a solely private bailout).
218. Supra Part III.D.
219. Many critics point out that executive compensation has increased to an
unreasonable level at the expense of shareholders without asking for much in return from
the executives. See Yermack, supra note 58 (discussing CEO perks, particularly the use of
corporate planes); Nick Bunkley, Ford Pays Chief $28 Million for 4 Months’ Work, N.Y.
TIMES, April 6, 2008 (“[In 2007,] the Ford Motor Company paid its new chief executive,
Alan R. Mulally, $28.18 million in his first four months on the job . . . .”); Eric Dash, Has
the Exit Sign Ever Looked So Good?, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2007, available at
(“At
America’s
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/business/yourmoney/08axe.html
biggest companies, it was possible for chief executives to fumble, fudge or fail to deliver
results—and yet still walk away with more money than most people earn in a lifetime.”).
220. See Dash, Has the Exit Sign Ever Looked So Good?, supra note 219 (discussing the
exit packages of the chief executives of America’s biggest companies).
221. Contra Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2399-2403 (1998) (proposing a securities regulation
regime based self-regulatory organizations such as stock exchanges).
222. In 2006, when the SEC proposed new rules concerning executive compensation
disclosure, it generated the most comments in the history of SEC rule proposals. See SEC,
Changes to Executive Compensation Disclosure, supra note 39 (“With more than 20,000
comments, and counting, it is now official that no issue in the 72 years of the Commission's
history has generated such interest.” (quoting SEC chairman Christopher Cox)).
223. See, e.g., Alstine, supra note 41, at 789-94 (examining the compliance costs of new
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have a chilling effect on potential executives, and the U.S. capital markets
for initial public offerings. 224 These concerns are legitimate because
regulators have acted in reactionary and blunt manners in the past. 225
However, when taken into consideration and balanced against creating
better corporate governance and more public trust in the securities market,
regulations requiring more meaningful and material private disclosure
about executive officers that respect the privacy of executives and the
business judgment of companies is desirable. 226
From a financial costs perspective, the costs for requiring and
producing additional disclosure by executive officers, as proposed, are
minimal because it works within the current regulatory apparatus.
Arguably, no new rules need to be imposed, no new monitoring mechanism
is needed, and no new board committees are required. The greatest cost is
likely not a financial one, but an emotional and psychological one; it is the
toll that is exacted from the disclosing executive and their family. 227 That
cost, while unquantifiable in financial terms, may be significant enough to
have a chilling effect on qualified, but very private, people who are
considering becoming public company executives 228 either through
ascension in a public company or through an initial public offering of a
private company. 229
laws and regulations for companies).
224. Regulatory costs imposed on public companies can have an effect on existing public
companies as well as companies that are considering taking themselves public. Absent
clear, sensible regulations and implementation, new rules can have adverse impact on
capital markets in this country. See Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 39, at ii (“[O]ur
regulatory framework is a thicket of complicated rules, rather than a streamlined set of
commonly understood principles, as is the case in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The
flawed implementation of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which produced far heavier
costs than expected, has only aggravated the situation . . . .”); Nathan Wilda, David Pays
For Goliath’s Mistakes: The Costly Effect Sarbanes-Oxley Has On Small Companies, 38 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 671, 671-80 (2004) (discussing how Sarbanes-Oxley did not properly
take into account its impact on smaller companies, which resulted in serious costs burdens
on small public companies and small private companies contemplating a public offering).
225. Whereas obtuse, rigid regulations can stunt and stifle economic growth, smart,
principled regulation can coexist with and spur economic expansion. The history of the
American stock markets serve as anecdotal proof that market growth can run on parallel
tracks with regulatory expansion.
226. See supra Part IV (outlining a model approach).
227. See Hemingway, supra note 172, at 767-68 (“[E]xecutives must make these
decisions in what may be highly stressful or emotionally charged situations (e.g., under
threat of criminal prosecution or civil enforcement, in the wake of a medical diagnosis of a
serious or terminal illness, at a time of financial strife, or during the course of a divorce or
nonpublic extramarital affair).”).
228. See generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (discussing
covering in the context of discrimination and civil rights).
229. See generally William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley:
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The chilling effect of additional private disclosures is mitigated by the
two-part disclosure process, the presumably enticing compensation of
being a public company executive, 230 and the allure of public funds. The
proposed two-part disclosure process only publicizes the private
information after confidential deliberation about whether such private
information is material to a reasonable investor. Absent extenuating
circumstances, it is unlikely that frivolous, irrelevant, and perhaps
embarrassing information would be disclosed by a company. Absent a
uniform standard, as under the proposed model, companies will continue to
disclose diversely or not at all because of privacy and other concerns. 231
While the chilling effect of additional disclosure requirements may
give momentary pause to private entrepreneurs thinking about making an
initial public offering in the United States, the warmth emanating from the
draw, integrity, and strength of the US capital markets will likely prove too
tempting to resist. 232 During the implementation of Sarbanes Oxley in
2002, some argued that the additional regulations would lead to a serious
decline in initial public offerings in the US markets and a mass exodus to
foreign markets. 233 Nearly a decade after Sarbanes Oxley, that fear has not
materialized. 234 Maintaining high standards of integrity in the U.S. capital
markets 235 may add costs to companies and their executives in the near
The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 141-48 (2006) (criticizing the heavy
compliance costs of Sarbanes-Oxley on small companies and its chilling effect on public
offerings in the U.S. capital markets).
230. See Dash, supra note 1, at A1 (discussing compensation packages and perks of
public company executives); Yermack, supra note 58 (discussing the role of perquisites in
managerial compensation); Rajan & Wulf, supra note 58 (examining how treating perks as
merely managerial excess is incorrect).
231. See Nocera, supra note 7, at C1 (discussing the reluctance of companies to talk
about private matters concerning their executives because of privacy concerns).
232. See Richard D. Truesdell, Jr. & Margaret E. Tahyar, Increasing the Attractiveness
of U.S. Capital Markets to Foreign Private Issuers, THE REVIEW OF SECURITIES &
COMMODITIES REGULATION, April, 2008, at 37 (discussing the attractiveness of U.S. capital
markets in light of recent SEC regulations).
233. See, e.g., Chang & Evans, supra note 60, at 51 (“The available evidence suggests
that companies have had a greater likelihood of staying or going private, and of choosing a
non-U.S. stock exchange for an IPO, following Sarbanes-Oxley.”).
234. See Annette L. Nazareth, SEC Commissioner, Remarks Before the ALI-ABA
Sarbanes-Oxley Institute, (Oct. 12, 2006) (“[T]he percentage of American companies which
conduct their IPOs in the U.S. has remained steady.”); contra Bloomberg & Schumer, supra
note 39, at 43 (citing evidence that suggest a migration of initial public offerings from U.S.
exchanges).
235. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Law and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 978-82 (1992) (discussing how securities regulations maintain
high integrity in capital markets and reduce the social costs associated with inefficient
prices); Bloomberg & Schumer, supra note 39, at ii (“The time has come not only to reexamine implementation of SOX, but also to undertake broader reforms, using a principles
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term, but will ultimately pay greater dividends through more investment
motivated by greater trust in the markets. 236
C.

Privacy Concerns

Requiring additional disclosure from public company executives that
include certain material private matters will undoubtedly raise concerns
about the individual’s privacy rights. These privacy concerns are
legitimate, but must be examined in the context of contemporary capital
markets, the enhanced role of the executive, and modern media.
While there is no consensus on a definition of privacy, 237 there is
greater consensus that all persons have a right to privacy. That right to
privacy, like its varied meanings, is neither uniform nor absolute—lines are
drawn, exceptions are made, rules are discriminately applied. 238 When it
comes to public company executives, their privacy rights are not like those
of an ordinary, private citizen because there is a meaningful “public
based approach to eliminate duplication and inefficiencies in our regulatory system. And
we must do both while ensuring that we maintain our strong protections for investors and
consumers.”).
236. See Nazareth, supra note 234 and accompanying text (“The United States
historically has been a leader in the area of corporate governance. . . . We cannot let our
rules stagnate lest they become impediments to progress and to investment in America's
capital markets.”); contra Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and
Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 175-81 (1984) (suggesting
that certain new regulations which improve market confidence and pricing are not justified
by the costs imposed on issuers and underwriters in public offerings).
237. See e.g., 41 Am. Jur. Privacy § 2 (1942) (defining privacy, in part, as the right of a
person to be free from unwarranted publicity); see also ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS:
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 34 (1988) (“[P]rivacy denotes a degree of
inaccessibility of persons, their mental states, and information about them to the senses and
surveillance devices of others.”); SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT
& REVELATION, 10-11 (1983) (“[P]rivacy [i]s the condition of being protected from
unwanted access by others–either physical access, personal information or attention.”);
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (The Association of the Bar of the city of New
York 1967) (“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others.”); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980)
(“[P]rivacy is a limitation of others’ access to an individual. . . . [A]n individual enjoys
perfect privacy when he is completely inaccessible to others.”); Tom Gerety, Redefining
Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977) (defining privacy as autonomy or
control over the intimacies of personal identity); Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42
N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35-36 (1967) (“[P]rivacy is the condition of human life in which
acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited.”).
238. See DAVID KORN, MEDICAL INFORMATION PRIVACY AND THE CONDUCT OF
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, PRIVACY AND HEALTHCARE (Biomedical Ethics Reviews) 107
(James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 2001) (“[I]n contemporary society there is
and can be no absolute right to privacy.”).

424

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:2

interest” in their private matters. 239 The privacy rights of public company
executives are more akin to those of celebrities 240 and public officials in
that they arguably have a lower expectation of privacy and cannot be
expected to be “let alone.” 241 Our elected federal politicians are required
by law to make certain financial disclosures about their personal
finances, 242 and they expect that their private lives will be fair game to the
media. Likewise, celebrities understand that their privacy rights are not
like those of the ordinary citizen because they are “public figures” under
the law. 243 Akin to celebrities, 244 executives who run public companies
should reasonably expect to abdicate a certain level of privacy. 245
The proliferation of modern media has increased the public’s appetite
for information about public figures. 246 The proliferation of new media
coupled with the growth in securities investing by ordinary citizens has
further intensified coverage of public company executives. 247 Perpetual
business news channels, websites, chat rooms, and blogs all exist to satisfy
the public’s insatiable appetite for more information. 248 As a result, actions
of public company officials are closely monitored, and their “zone of
privacy” 249 and “expectation of privacy” 250 have diminished in the 21st
239. See Maremont, supra note 26, at A1 (discussing scholarship that studied the impact
of CEO’s private lives on their companies); Bennedsen et al., supra note 177 (examining the
impact of certain events in the private lives of the CEO on firm performance).
240. See, e.g., John R. Engen, Hiring a Celebrity CEO, BOARD MEMBER MAGAZINE,
Winter 2000 (discussing the celebrity status of a CEO and the potential gains and perils of a
hiring a celebrity CEO).
241. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P.2d 91, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)
242. See http://www.opensecrets.org/pfds/index.php (cataloguing financial disclosure
forms of federal elected officials).
243. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974) (holding that when the
media defames a private individual, it cannot claim a constitutional privilege against
liability).
244. See HAIGH, supra note 62, at 96-103 (describing the ascent to cult status of the CEO
in contemporary society).
245. See In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 174 (1964) (noting how the solicitation of
public funds for a company can result in diminished levels of privacy for that company’s
executives).
246. See Edwin Lawrence Godkin, The Rights Of The Citizen, IV. —To His Own
Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER’S MAG. 58, 66 (July 1890) (“The chief enemy of privacy in modern
life is that interest in other people and their affairs known as curiosity, which in the days
before newspapers created personal gossip.”); see also SEC, Disclosure to Investors
(exploring how public companies can effectively disclose information to investors).
247. See HAIGH, supra note 62, at 97-99.
248. See Clifford & Anderson, supra note 38 (discussing the growth of new sources of
information for business news and gossip).
249. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (discussing how the appellees contend
that the statute invades a constitutionally protected “zone of privacy.”). The cases
sometimes characterized as protecting “privacy” have in fact involved at least two different
kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
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Century. Additional regulated disclosure, as proposed, should reasonably
be expected to fit into this shrunken zone of privacy.
Being a public company executive comes with the occupational
hazard of less privacy, which is compensated for in terms of prestige,
perks, and money. 251 Nonetheless, due consideration must be given to the
disclosure of private, material matters of executives. Matters such as
serious illness, pending divorce, and potential crime can be legally complex
and deeply personal, 252 and deciding to disclose such matters must be done
with due consideration for the executive. Under this Article’s proposed
two-step model approach, reasonable deference is given to the disclosing
executive and the judgment of the company’s management. 253 Only private
matters determined to be material and proper for timely disclosure will be
made public, while private matters that are immaterial and irrelevant to the
investing public will remain undisclosed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Disclosing material private matters of public company executives is a
difficult and complex but sometimes necessary act. Advocates that favor
more disclosure and advocates that favor more privacy both have many
legitimate arguments and concerns. In this Article, I have argued that when
viewed in the context of contemporary capital markets, the enhanced role
of the executive, and the modern media additional disclosure from
executives about material, private matters is desirable. In support of this
argument, I have proposed a principle-based model approach that affords
companies and executives reasonable deference on what to disclose and
how to disclose it, while simultaneously strengthening regulatory
safeguards for the investing public with minimal compliance burdens.
This model approach for addressing the issue of material, private
matters of executives, while sensible, will not be quickly implemented. No
and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.
250. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
251. See Rajan & Wulf, supra note 58 (explaining how perks are not simply managerial
excess); see also Yermack, supra note 58 (examining the perks involved for executive
officers).
252. See Glenn, supra note 25, at 542-43 (discussing potential conflicts between SEC
requirements and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the context of disclosing
executive illness); see also Hemingway, supra note 172, at 764-770 (raising potential
privacy, First Amendment, and Fifth Amendment issues in the context of executive
disclosure). See generally Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is
Regulation Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing
the constitutionality of Regulation Fair Disclosure).
253. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the disclosure process under our proposed model
approach).
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regulatory approach that implicates billions of dollars, personal facts of
powerful executives, privacy rights, and investments of ordinary
Americans will have a smooth and easy implementation; nor should it.
Asking someone to disclose to the world a personal ailment, a private
tragedy, or an intimate fact for the sake of better corporate governance and
market integrity is not easy, for these are not easy simple issues with
straight-forward resolutions. In the end, my hope is that by thinking and
talking about these issues, we can begin to raise the level of corporate
awareness and debate and thereby engender increased disclosure of
material, private matters prior to the passage of any rule or law.

